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Abstract
We study the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items among n agents with additive
valuations using the popular notion of maximin share (MMS) as our measure of fairness. An
MMS allocation provides each agent a bundle worth at least her maximin share. While it is
known that such an allocation need not exist [23, 19], a series of work [23, 20, 2, 6, 15] provided
2/3 approximation algorithms in which each agent receives a bundle worth at least 2/3 times her
maximin share. More recently, [16] showed the existence of 3/4 MMS allocations and a PTAS
to find a 3/4 −  MMS allocation. Most of the previous works utilize intricate algorithms and
require agents’ approximate MMS values, which are computationally expensive to obtain.
In this paper, we develop a new approach that gives a simple algorithm for showing the
existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation. Furthermore, our approach is powerful enough to be easily
extended in two directions: First, we get a strongly polynomial time algorithm to find a 3/4-
MMS allocation, where we do not need to approximate the MMS values at all. Second, we
show that there always exists a (34 +
1
12n )-MMS allocation, breaking the barrier of 3/4. This
considerably improves the approximation guarantee for small n. To the best of our knowledge,
3/4 was the best factor known for n > 4.
1 Introduction
Fair division is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings, where the goal is to divide
a set of resources among agents in a fair manner. It has been subject of intense study since the
seminal work of Steinhaus [24] where he introduced the cake-cutting problem for n > 2 agents:
Given a heterogeneous (divisible) cake and a set of agents with different valuation functions, the
problem is to find a fair allocation. The two most well-studied notions of fairness are: 1) Envy-
freeness, where each agent prefers her own share of cake over any other agents’ share, and 2)
Proportionality, where each agent receives a share that is worth at least 1/n of her value for the
entire cake.
We study the case where a set of m indivisible items needs to be divided among n agents with
additive valuations. In this case, no algorithm can provide either envy-freeness or proportionality,
e.g., consider allocating a single item among n > 1 agents. This necessitated the need for an
alternate concept of fairness. Budish [12] introduced an intriguing option called maximin share,
which has attracted a lot of attention [23, 19, 16, 15, 20, 6, 14, 2]. The idea is a straightforward
generalization of the popular cut and choose protocol in the cake cutting problem and a natural
relaxation of proportionality. Suppose we ask an agent i to partition the items into n bundles (one
for each agent), with the condition that other n − 1 agents get to choose a bundle before her. In
the worst case, i receives the least preferred bundle. Clearly, in such a situation, the agent will
∗Supported by NSF CRII Award 1755619.
†University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
00
02
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
5 F
eb
 20
20
choose a partition that maximizes the value of her least preferred bundle. This maximum possible
value is called i’s maximin share (MMS) value. In fact, when all agents have the same valuations,
i cannot guarantee more than the MMS value.
Each agent’s MMS value is a specific objective that gives her an intuitive measure of the fairness
of an allocation. This raises a natural question: Is there an allocation where each agent receives a
bundle that is worth at least her MMS value? An allocation satisfying this property is said to be
maximin share allocation (MMS allocation), and if it exists, it provides strong fairness guarantees
to each individual agent. However, Procaccia and Wang [23] showed that MMS allocation might not
exist, but a 23 -MMS allocation always exists, i.e., an allocation where each agent receives a bundle
worth at least 23 of their MMS value. Later, Ghodsi et al. [16] improved the factor by showing the
existence of a 34 -MMS allocation using a sophisticated technique with very long analysis.
We note that these are only existential results, which do not provide any efficient algorithm to
find such an allocation. The main issue in these techniques is the need for agents’ MMS values. The
problem of finding the MMS value of an agent is NP-hard,1 but a polynomial time approximation
scheme (PTAS) exists [25]. Theoretically, one can use PTAS to find a (34 − )-MMS allocation for
an  > 0 in polynomial time. However, for practical purposes, such algorithms are not very useful
for small . Hence, finding an efficient algorithm to compute a 34 -MMS allocation remained open.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we develop a new approach that gives a simple algorithm for showing the existence
of a 34 -MMS allocation. Furthermore, our approach is powerful enough to be easily extended in two
directions: First, we get a strongly polynomial time algorithm to find a 34 -MMS allocation, where
we do not need to approximate the MMS values at all. Second, we show that there always exists a
(34 +
1
12n)-MMS allocation, breaking the barrier of
3
4 . This considerably improves the approximation
guarantee for small n. We note that there are works, e.g., [2, 16], exploring better approximation
factors for a small number of agents, and, to the best of our knowledge, 34 was the best factor known
for n > 4.
Our algorithms are extremely simple. We first describe the basic algorithm, given in Section 3,
that shows the existence of 34 -MMS allocations. Since MMS values are scale-invariant, we scale
valuations to make each agent’s MMS value 1. Then, we assign high-value items to agents, who
value them at least 34 , with a simple greedy approach based on the pigeonhole principle, and remove
the assigned items and the agents receiving these items from further consideration. This reduces
the number of high-value items to be at most 2n′, where n′ is the number of remaining agents.
These greedy assignments massively simplify allocation of high-value items, which was the most
challenging part of previous algorithms. Next, we prepare n′ bags, one for each remaining agent,
and put at most two high-value items in each bag. Then, we add low-value items on top of each
of these bags one by one using a bag-filling procedure until the value of bag for some agent is at
least 34 . The main technical challenge here is to show that there are enough low-value items to give
every agent a bag they value at least 34 .
In Section 4, we extend the basic algorithm to compute a 34 -MMS allocation without any need
to compute the actual MMS values. Here, we define a notion of tentative assignments and a novel
way for updating the MMS upper bound. For each agent, we use the average value, that is the
value of all items divided by the number of agents, as an upper bound of her MMS value. The only
change from the basic algorithm is that some of the greedy assignments are tentative, i.e., they
are valid only if the current upper bound of the MMS values is tight enough. We show that this
1Observe that the partition problem reduces to the MMS value problem with n = 2.
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can be checked by using the total valuation of low-value items. If the upper bounds are not tight
enough for some agents, then we update the MMS value of such an agent and repeat. We show
that we do not need to update the MMS upper bounds more than O(n3) times before we have a
good upper bound on all MMS values. Then, we show that the same bag filling procedure, as in
the basic algorithm, satisfy every remaining agent. The running time of the entire algorithm is
O(nm(n4 + logm)).
In Section 5, we extend the basic algorithm to show the existence of (34 +
1
12n)-MMS allocations.
The entire algorithm remains exactly the same but with an involved analysis. The analysis is tricky
in this case, so we add a set of dummy items to make proofs easy and more intuitive. We use these
items to make up for the extra loss for the remaining agents due to the additional factor, and, of
course, these items are not assigned to any agent in the algorithm.
1.2 Related Work
Maximin share is a popular fairness notion of allocating indivisible items among agents. Bouveret
and Lemaˆıtre [9] showed that an MMS allocation always exists in some restricted cases, e.g., when
there are only two agents or if agents’ valuations for items are either 0 or 1, but left the general case
as an open problem. As mentioned earlier, Procaccia and Wang [23] showed that MMS allocation
might not exist, but a 23 -MMS allocation always exists. They also provided a polynomial time
algorithm to find a 23 -MMS allocation when the number of agents n is constant. For the special
case of four agents, their algorithm finds a 34 -MMS allocation. Amanatidis et al. [2] improved this
result by addressing the requirement for a constant number of agents, obtaining a PTAS which
finds a (23 − ) MMS allocation for an arbitrary number of agents; see [20] for an alternate proof.
[2] also showed that a 78 MMS allocation always exists when there are three agents. This factor
was later improved to 89 in [17].
Taking a different approach, Barman and Murthy [6] obtained a greedy algorithm to find a
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3 -MMS allocation. While their algorithm is fairly simple, the analysis is not. More recently, Garg
et al. [15] obtained a simple algorithm to find a 23 -MMS allocation that also has a simple analysis.
Ghodsi et al. [16] improved these results by showing the existence of a 34 -MMS allocation and
a PTAS to find a (34 − ) MMS allocation.
Maximin share fairness has also been studied in many different setting, e.g., for asymmetric
agents (i.e., agents with different entitlements) [14], for group fairness [4, 13], beyond additive
valuations [6, 16, 21], in matroids [17], with additional constraints [17, 8], for agents with external-
ities [11, 1], with graph constraints [7, 22], for allocating chores [3, 6, 18], and with strategic agents
[5].
2 The MMS Problem and its Properties
We consider the fair allocation of a set M of m indivisible items among a set N of n agents with
additive valuations, using the popular notion of maximin share (MMS) as our measure of fairness.
Let vij denote agent i’s utility for item j, and i’s valuation of any bundle S ⊆M of items is given
by vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vij . Let V = (v1, . . . , vn) denote the set of all valuation functions.
Let I = 〈N,M, V 〉 denote an instance of the fair division problem, and let Πn(M) = {P =
{P1, . . . , Pn} | Pi∩Pj = ∅, ∀i, j; ∪kPk = M} be the set of all feasible partitions of M into n bundles
(one for each agent). Agent i’s maximin share µni (M) (or simply µi when n and M are clear from
the context) is defined as the maximum value she can guarantee herself if she is allowed to choose
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P , on the condition that other agents choose their bundles from the partition before her, i.e.,
µni (M) = max
P∈Πn(M)
min
Pk∈P
vi(Pk) . (1)
Further, let Pni (M) denote the set of partitions achieving µni (M), i.e.,
Pni (M) = argmax
P∈Πn(M)
min
Pk∈P
vi(Pk) . (2)
We say an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is MMS if each agent i receives a bundle Ai worth at
least her maximin share, i.e., vi(Ai) ≥ µi,∀i ∈ N . An allocation A is α approximate MMS (or
simply α-MMS), for some α ∈ (0, 1) if vi(Ai) ≥ α · µi, ∀i ∈ N . The MMS problem is to find an
α-MMS allocation for a given α.
2.1 Properties of MMS Allocation
In this section, we state some of the nice properties of maximin shares that our algorithm exploits.
We note that these are standard results appeared in [23, 2, 10, 6, 15, 16]. For completeness, we
include their proofs in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. (Average upper bounds MMS). µni (M) ≤ vi(M)/n,∀i ∈ N .
Lemma 2. (Scale Invariance). Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an α-MMS allocation for instance
I = 〈N,M, V 〉. If we create an alternate instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉 where valuations of some agent
i are scaled by c > 0, i.e., v′ij := c · vij , ∀j ∈M , then µ′i = c · µi and A is an α-MMS allocation for
I ′ .
2.1.1 Ordered Instances
We say that an instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 is ordered if:
vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vim, ∀i ∈ N .
In words, in an ordered instance, all agents have the same order of preferences over items.
Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre [10] showed that the ordered instances are worst case. They provided a
reduction from any arbitrary instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 to an ordered instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉, and
showed that if A′ is an MMS allocation for I ′, then one can find an MMS allocation A for I in
polynomial time. Later, Barman and Murthy [6] generalized this result for α approximate MMS
allocations. This property is used by [6, 15] to find a 23 -MMS allocation. Observe that MMS value
of an agent i in instance I and I ′ is the same because MMS value neither depends on the order of
the items nor on the valuations of the other agents.
Lemma 3. (Ordered Instance [10, 6]). Without loss of generality, we can assume that agents
have the same order of preference over the items, i.e., vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vim, ∀i ∈ N .
2.1.2 Bag Filling for Low Value Items
Ghodsi et al. [16] showed that if we normalize the valuation of agents so that µni (M) = 1, ∀i ∈ N
and vij ≤ α,∀i ∈ N, j ∈M , then we can find a (1− α)-MMS allocation using the following simple
bag filling procedure: All items are unallocated in the beginning. Start with an empty bag B and
keep filling it with unallocated items until some agent i values B at least (1−α). Then, allocate B
4
to i (choose i arbitrarily if there are more such agents). Note that any remaining agent values B at
most one because before adding the last item to B everyone values it less than (1− α) and adding
one item will not increase the value of B more than α. Hence, the value of B for any remaining
agent is at most one. Since vi(M) ≥ |N |, ∀i using Lemma 1, there are enough items to satisfy all
the agents with a bag that they value (1− α).
In Section 3.2, we design a more general bag filling procedure.
2.1.3 Reduction
A useful concept of valid reduction is used in [19, 20, 2, 16] and later used in [15]. From (1), µki (S)
denote the MMS value of agent i when S is the set of items that needs to be divided among k
agents (including i). Recall that for the α-MMS allocation problem for instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, we
want to partition M into |N | bundles (A1, . . . , A|N |) such that vi(Ai) ≥ α · µ|N |i (M), ∀i.
Definition 1 (Valid reduction). For obtaining a α-MMS allocation, the act of removing a set
Ai ⊆M of items and an agent i from M and N is called a valid reduction if
vi(Ai) ≥ α · µ|N |i (M)
µ
|N |−1
i′ (M \Ai) ≥ µ|N |i′ (M), ∀i′ ∈ N \ {i} .
(3)
Clearly, an α-MMS allocation for the smaller instance, obtained through valid reduction, gives
an α-MMS allocation for the original instance. In our algorithms, we use it to remove high-value
items and get smaller instances.
3 Existence of 3/4-MMS Allocation
In this section, we present a simple proof of the existence of 34 -MMS allocation for a given instance
I = 〈N,M, V 〉. We assume that the MMS value µi of each agent i is given. Finding an exact µi is
an NP-Hard problem, however a PTAS exists [25]. This implies a PTAS to compute a (34−)-MMS
allocation for any  > 0. Using the properties shown in Section 2.1, we normalize valuations so
that µn1 (M) = 1, ∀i and assume that I is an ordered instance, i.e., vi1 ≥ · · · ≥ vim,∀i. Our proof
is algorithmic. If more than one agent satisfy the conditions (3) of valid reduction, then we choose
one arbitrarily.
For the ease of exposition, we abuse the notation and use M and N to respectively denote the
set of unallocated items and the set of agents who have not received any bundle yet. Further, we
use j to denote the jth highest value item in M . Moreover, we use n := |N | and m := |M |.
The algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. We use α = 34 in this section. Later, in Section 5, we
use the same algorithm for α = 34 +
1
12n . It has two main parts: Initial Assignment and Bag Filling.
Algorithm 1: α-MMS Allocation
Input : Ordered Instance 〈N,M, V 〉, i.e., vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vim,∀i ∈ N and α
Output: α-MMS Allocation
1 Normalize Valuations // Scale valuations so that µni (M) = 1,∀i
2 (N,M, V )← Initial-Assignment(N,M, V, α) // Algorithm 2
3 Bag-Filling(N,M, V, α) // Algorithm 3
5
3.1 Initial Assignment
We first assign high-value items using Algorithm 2. We note that handling high-value items is the
biggest challenge in the MMS problem, e.g., a major part of Ghodsi et al. algorithm [16] is devoted
to allocating high-value items. In our algorithms, we make it a simple process of greedy assignment
by leveraging the pigeonhole principle to make valid reductions. We define bundles S1 := {1},
S2 := {n, n+ 1}, S3 := {2n− 1, 2n, 2n+ 1}, and S4 := {1, 2n+ 1}, where S1 has the highest value
item in M for all agents, S2 has the n
th and (n+ 1)th highest valued items in M for all agents, and
so on. Note that these bundles change after every valid reduction.
In Algorithm 2, we keep assigning a bundle S ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4} to agent i, if any, for which
vi(S) ≥ 34 . Then, we update M and N to respectively reflect the current unallocated items and
agents who are not assigned with any bundle yet. In Lemma 4, we show that assigning such a
bundle S ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4} is a valid reduction.
Algorithm 2: Initial-Assignment
Input : Ordered Instance 〈N,M, V 〉, where µni (M) = 1,∀i ∈ N , and α
Output: Reduced Instance
1 For any S ⊆M , define Γ(S) := {i ∈ N : vi(S) ≥ α}
2 n← |N | // n changes with N
3 S1 ← {1}; S2 ← {n, n+ 1}; S3 ← {2n− 1, 2n, 2n+ 1}; S4 ← {1, 2n+ 1} // bundles that can be
assigned
4 T ← Γ(S1) ∪ Γ(S2) ∪ Γ(S3) ∪ Γ(S4)
5 while T 6= ∅ do
6 S ← the lowest index bundle in {S1, S2, S3, S4} for which Γ(S) 6= ∅
7 i← an agent in T
8 Assign S to agent i // initial assignment
9 Update N,M, V, T
10 return 〈N,M, V 〉
Lemma 4 ([16, 15]). Removing items in S ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4} and agent i with vi(S) ≥ 34 is a valid
reduction.
Proof. Clearly, vi(S) ≥ 34 . Therefore, we only need to show the second condition in Definition 1.
We show this separately for each case of S ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4}. Let i′ be a remaining agent after the
reduction. We show that after removing S, there exists a partition of remaining items into n − 1
bundles such that the value of each bundle is at least µni′(M), i.e., µ
n−1
i′ (M \ S) ≥ µni′(M). Recall
from (2) that P ∈ Pni′ (M) denote a partition achieving µni′(M).
• S = S1. Removal of one item from P affects exactly one bundle and each of the remaining
n− 1 bundles has value at least µni′(M). Therefore, µn−1i′ (M \ {1}) ≥ µni′(M), ∀i′ ∈ N \ {i}.
• S = S2. In P , there exists a bundle with two items from {1, . . . , n+1} (pigeonhole principle).
Let T be a bundle in P that has two items from {1, . . . , n+ 1}. Let us exchange these items
with items n and n+ 1 in other bundles and distribute any remaining item in T among other
bundles arbitrarily. Clearly, the value of other bundles except T does not decrease, and hence
µn−1i′ (M \ {n, n+ 1}) ≥ µni′(M), ∀i′ ∈ N \ {i}.
• S = S3. Similar to the proof of Case 2.
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Figure 1: Setting of the items in the bags
• S = S4. In a partition of Pni′ (M) (i′ 6= i), if items 1 and 2n+ 1 are in the same bundle, then
clearly, removing S4 and agent i is a valid reduction. For the other case, if 1 and 2n+1 are in
two different bundles, then we can make two new bundles, one with {1, 2n+ 1} and another
with all the remaining items of the two bundles. The value of the bundle without {1, 2n+ 1}
is at least one because vi′1 <
3
4 and vi′(2n+1) <
1
4 , for all i
′ since we always choose the lowest
index bundle (in line 6 of Algorithm 2). Hence, this is a valid reduction.
3.2 Bag Filling
We use the bag filling procedure given in Algorithm 3 to satisfy the remaining agents. Let J1 :=
{1, . . . , n} denote the set of first n items. Similarly, let us define J2 := {n + 1, . . . , 2n} and
J := J1∪J2. We call J to be the set of high-value items. The following corollary is straightforward.
Corollary 4.1. If vi(S) <
3
4 ,∀i and ∀S ∈ {S1, S2, S3}, then (i) vij < 34 , ∀j ∈ J1, (ii) vij < 38 , ∀j ∈
J2, and vin <
3
4 − vi(n+1), and (iii) vij < 14 , ∀j ∈M \ J , for all i.
We first initialize n bags as follows:
B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn}, where Bk = {k, 2n− k + 1}, ∀k . (4)
Each bag contains one item from J1 and one item from J2 such that from B1 to Bn value of
items from J1 decreases and value of items from J2 increases (see Figure 1).
Algorithm 3 has n rounds. In each round k, it starts a new bundle T with T ← Bk. If there is
an agent who values T to be at least 34 , then assign T to such an agent. Otherwise, keep adding
items from M \ J to T one by one until someone values T at least 34 .
Algorithm 3: Bag Filling Algorithm for α-MMS Allocation
Input : Reduced Instance 〈N,M, V 〉 with µni = 1,∀i
Output: Allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) where vi(Ai) ≥ α
1 Initialize Bags B = {Bi}i∈N as in (4) // see Figure 1
2 L←M \ J
3 for i = 1 to n do
4 T ← Bi
5 Define N(T ) := {i ∈ N : vi(T ) ≥ α}
6 while N(T ) = ∅ do
7 j ∈ L // pick one low value item arbitrarily
8 T ← T ∪ {j}; L← L \ {j} // add the new to item the bag
9 Ai ← T, i ∈ N(T ); N ← N \ {i} // assign bundle T to an agent i ∈ N(T )
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For correctness, we need to show that there are enough items in M \ J to add on top of each
bag in (4) so that each agent gets a bundle which they value at least 34 . For this, we first divide
agents into two types: N1 := {i ∈ N | vi(Bk) ≤ 1,∀k} and N2 := N \N1.
If N2 is empty, then it is easy to check using the ideas in Section 2.1.2 that Algorithm 3 gives
each agent at least 34 . We need some more notation to show correctness when N
2 is not empty.
For an agent i ∈ N2, define
Li := {Bk : vi(Bk) < 34}; li := |Li| and Ki := {Bk : vi(Bk) > 1}; ki := |Ki|
xi := (
3
4)li −
∑
k:Bk∈Li
vi(Bk).
(5)
In words, Li is the set of bags that i values strictly less than
3
4 , Ki is the set of bags that i values
strictly more than 1, and li and ki are the number of bags in Li and Ki respectively. Further, xi
is the least total value needed to make all bags in Li at least
3
4 .
Lemma 5. For an agent i ∈ N2, (i) li > 0 and ki > 0, (ii) vi1 > 58 , (iii) vi(Bk) < 98 ,∀k, and (iv)
vij <
1
8 ,∀j ∈M \ J .
Proof. For the first part, if ki = 0 then i ∈ N1. Further, li = 0 implies that vi(Bn) ≥ 34 , which
cannot be true due to Corollary 4.1.
For the second part, vij <
3
8 ,∀j ∈ J2 due to Corollary 4.1. Since ki > 0, there exists a j ∈ J1
such that vij >
5
8 . Further, since item 1 is the highest value item for every agent, vi1 >
5
8 .
For the third part, each item of J1 has value less than
3
4 and each item of J2 has value less than
3
8 (Corollary 4.1) for any agent. Therefore, vi(Bk) <
9
8 for any bundle Bk.
For the fourth part, the value of item 1 for an agent i ∈ N2 is more than 58 and vi(S4) < 34 ,
hence vij ≤ vi(2n+1) < 18 ,∀j ∈M \ J .
Lemma 6. If vi(M \ J) ≥ xi + li/8 − 1/8, ∀i ∈ N2, then Algorithm 3 gives every agent a bundle
that they value at least 34 .
Proof. This is proof by contradiction. Suppose the algorithm stops at round t because there are
not enough items in L (= M \ J) to satisfy any remaining agent i, i.e., vi(Bt ∪ L) < 34 .
If i ∈ N1, each removed bundle in rounds k ∈ [t−1], has value of at most 1 for agent i. Because,
if vi(Bk) ≥ 34 for k ∈ [t − 1], no more item has been added to T = Bk. Also, if vi(Bk) < 34 for
k ∈ [t− 1] before adding the last item (if any) to T the value of T is less that 34 and from Corollary
4.1, vij <
1
4 for j ∈ L. Therefore, at the end of the round vi(T ) < 1. Further, since vi(M) ≥ n and
vi(Bk) ≤ 1, ∀k, we have vi(Bt ∪ L) ≥ 1, which is a contradiction.
If i ∈ N2, then since at round t, vi(T ) < 34 , we have Bt ∈ Li. Consider a round k ∈ [t − 1]. If
Bk 6∈ Li, then T = Bk has been assigned to someone with no additional items added to T from L
because i ∈ N(T ). If Bk ∈ Li, then in round k, before adding the last item (if any) to T , the value
of i for T is less that 34 and from Lemma 5, all items in L have value of at most
1
8 . Therefore, if
Bk ∈ Li, the value of the assigned bag for i in round k is less that 78 . Hence, in the beginning of
the round t,
vi(L) ≥ (xi + li/8− 1/8)− (xi − (3/4− vi(Bt)) + (li − 1)/8)) = 3/4− vi(Bt),
which is a contradiction.
Hence, we only need to show that for each i ∈ N2, we have
vi(M \ J) ≥ xi + li/8− 1/8 . (6)
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In fact, we will show a stronger bound without −18 in Theorem 12. We will use the extra −18 to
improve the bound in Section 5. We start with a few lemmas. Recall from (2) that Pni (M) denote
the set of partitions achieving µni (M).
Lemma 7. For an agent i ∈ N2, there exists a bundle Pk in every partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈
Pni (M) such that vi(Pk \ J) > 14 .
Proof. If there exists a bundle Pk with exactly one item j from J , then vi(Pk \ J) = 1 − vij > 14
because value of every item is less than 34 . Otherwise, each bundle has exactly two items from J ,
which implies that one of the bundles, say Pk, has two items j1, j2 from the set {n} ∪ J2. Since
vij1 + vij2 ≤ vin + vi(n+1) < 34 , vi(Pk \ J) > 14 .
Lemma 8. For every agent i, there exists a partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈ Pni (M) such that each
Pk ∈ P has at most one item j with vij > 58 .
Proof. We show that if there are two items j1, j2 with each value more than
5
8 for an agent i in
a bundle Pk of P ∈ Pni (M), then we can construct another P ′ ∈ Pni (M) where this is not true.
Corollary 4.1 implies that there must exist another bundle Pk′ for which maxj∈Pk′ vij <
3
8 . If there
exists a partition Q1k′ and Q
2
k′ of items in Pk′ such that value of each Q
1
k′ and Q
2
k′ is at least
3
8 ,
then we can rearrange items in Pk ∪ Pk′ and make two new bundles ({j1} ∪Q1k′) and ({j2} ∪Q2k′).
Clearly, the value of each bundle is at least 1 and each has exactly one item with value more than
5
8 .
If no such Q1k′ and Q
2
k′ exists, then we claim that there exists a partition of Pk′ into three
sets with each value less than 38 . We can find this partition as follows: Initialize three empty
bundles, and repeatedly add the highest value item of Pk′ to the bundle with the lowest value. For
a contradiction, suppose one of the three bundles has value more than 38 , then the sum of the values
of the other two sets must be less than 38 because otherwise, they make a partition of two with
each value more than 38 . This means that at least one of the bundles must have a value less than
3
16 . This implies that the value of the largest bag before adding the last item must be less than
3
16
and the last item also should value less than 316 , which is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists a
partition Q1k′ , Q
2
k′ and Q
3
k′ of Pk′ such that each value less than
3
8 .
According to Lemma 7, there exists a bundle Pkˆ ∈ Pni (M) such that vi(Pkˆ \ J) > 14 . Let
vi(Pkˆ) = 1 + δ for some δ ≥ 0. Observe that Pk′ cannot be same as Pkˆ and Pk, otherwise we would
have made two bundles earlier, each with value at least 1 and exactly one item more than 58 . We
make three bags:
bag 1 : {j1} ∪Q1k′ bag 2 : {j2} ∪Q2k′ bag 3 : (Pkˆ ∩ J) ∪Q3k′
The value of each of bag 1 and bag 2 is at most 98 and the value of bag 3 is at most
9
8 + δ. The
total value of all items in Pk, Pk′ and Pkˆ is at least 3 +
2
8 + δ. We sort the remaining items in
decreasing order and add them one by one to a bag with the lowest value. Since the value of the
last item added to each bag has a value of at most 18 (from Lemma 5), each bag has a value of at
least 1 and it has at most one item with value more than 58 . We repeat this process for all bundles
with two item of value more than 58 to find a desired partition.
Let a be an agent in N2. For simplicity, until the end of this section, when we use value of
an item or a bundle, we mean their value for agent a (unless mentioned otherwise). Recall that
we need to show (6). Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pna (M) be a partition satisfying the condition of
Lemma 8.
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We manipulate P as follows: First, for each Bi = {j, j′} with 34 ≤ va(Bi) ≤ 1, if j ∈ Pk and
j′ ∈ Pk′ , then we turn Pk and Pk′ into two new bundles {j, j′} and (Pk ∪Pk′ \{j, j′}). Observe that
va (Pk ∪ Pk′ \ {j, j′}) ≥ 1. Hence, we can assume that for each Bi 6∈ La ∪Ka (as defined in (11)),
there exists a Pk = Bi and all other bundles value at least 1. Second, we re-enumerate the bundles
in P such that
• P1, . . . , Pt1 : each has an item, say j, of value more than 58 and va(Bj) < 34
• Pt1+1, . . . , Pt2 : each has an item, say j, of value more than 58 and va(Bj) > 1 (Observe that
there are ka such bundles, so t2 − t1 = ka)
• Pt3+1, . . . , Pn: each such Pk = Bk′ for some k′ and 34 ≤ va(Bk′) ≤ 1
• Pt2+1, . . . , Pt3 be the remaining bundles (Observe that t3 = la + ka).
Definition 2. Define y := vak′ where k
′ is the highest value item in the set {j ∈ J2∩Bk, Bk ∈ Ka}.
Observe that 28 < y <
3
8 . For instance, in Figure 1, if no bag from {Bk+1, . . . , Bn} is in Ka
but Bk ∈ Ka, then y = va(2n−k+1). This also implies that va1 ≥ · · · ≥ vak > 58 . Moreover,
y = va(2n−k+1) ≤ va(2n−k) ≤ · · · ≤ va(k+1), and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. For any bundle Bk = {j, j′} ∈ La such that vaj , vaj′ < 58 , we have vaj , vaj′ ≥ y.
Proof. The claim follows from the construction of Bk’s (in (4)), and the fact that each bundle of
Ka has an item with value more than 5/8.
Lemma 10. For agent a ∈ N2, if t1 = 0 then we have
1. xa ≤ (34 − 2y)la
2. va(M \ J) ≥ max{xa + la/4− yz + z/4, z/4)}, where z = max{2ka − |
⋃t2
t=t1+1
Pt ∩ J |, 0}.
Proof. For the first part, since t1 = 0, we have va(Bk) ≥ 2y,∀Bk ∈ La (Lemma 9). This implies
that x = (34)la −
∑
k:Bk∈La Bk ≤ (34 − 2y)la.
For the second part, in
⋃
k:Bk∈Ka Bk there are exactly 2ka items from J . If there are at least 2ka
items in
⋃t2
t=t1+1
Pt ∩J then z = 0. On the other hand, if there are 2ka− z items in
⋃t2
t=t1+1
Pt ∩J ,
then it means that there are at least z bundles in Pt1+1, . . . , Pt2 with exactly one item from J . Each
of these bundles need more than 14 value of items from M \ J to become 1.
Next, if z = 0, then all bundles in {Pt2+1, . . . , Pt3} need at least xa + la/4 value of items from
M \ J to become 1 because the value of each item in the bundles of La is at least y (follows from
Definition 4 and the construction of Bk’s in (4)). If z > 0, then all bundles in {Pt2+1, . . . , Pt3} need
at least xa + la/4 − yz value of items from M \ J to become one because each of the z items has
value at most y (Lemma 9). Therefore, in total, there should be at least xa + la/4− yz+ z/4 value
of items from M \ J in {Pt1+1, . . . , Pt3}.
Further, in case z is large such that the value of xa + la/4− yz + z/4 is negative, we still need
z/4 value of items from M \ J to make all bundles in {Pt1+1, . . . , Pt2} value 1.
Theorem 11. For agent a ∈ N2, if t1 = 0 then
va(M \ J) ≥ xa + la/8 . (7)
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Proof. Using Lemma 10(2) there are two cases for the maximum of xa + la/4− yz + z/4 and z/4.
We prove the claim for each case separately.
Case 1: Suppose xa + la/4 − yz + z/4 ≥ z/4, then z ≤ xa+la/4y . Further, Lemma 10(1) implies
y ≤ 3la−4xa8l . Using these, we get
va(M \ J) ≥ xa + la/4− z(y − 1/4) ≥ 4xa + la
16y
≥ (4xa + la)la
2(3la − 4xa) .
Next, consider
(4xa + la)la
2(3la − 4xa) −
(
xa +
la
8
)
=
28x2a + (2xa − la)2
8(3la − 4xa) ≥ 0 .
The last inequality follows because (3la−4xa) > 0 (Lemma 5). This implies va(M \J) ≥ xa+ la/8.
Case 2: Suppose xa + la/4− yz + z/4 ≤ z/4. Then, using Lemma 10(1), we have
va(M \ J) ≥ z/4 ≥ 4xa + la
16y
≥ (4xa + la)la
2(3la − 4xa) ≥ xa + la/8 .
Next, we handle the general case when t1 > 0. Let L
1 ⊆ La be the set of bags in La which have
one item with value more than 58 , and L
2 = La \ L1. Clearly, |L1| = t1 and |L2| = la − t1. Note
that |L2| > 1 because Bn ∈ L2.
Theorem 12. For agent a ∈ N2, we have va(M \ J) ≥ xa + la/8.
Proof. Let Jmin =
⋃
Bk∈L1 Bk ∩ J2. Then, we have vaj < 18 ,∀j ∈ Jmin because these items are
bagged with an item value more than 58 and together they have value less than
3
4 . Therefore,
va(Jmin) < t1/8. Let x
′
a :=
3
4 t1 −
∑
Bk∈L1 va(Bk), and x
′′
a := xa − x′a. For agent a, we can treat
items of Jmin as low value items so we will prove:
va((M ∪D) \ J) + va(Jmin) ≥ x′a + t1/4 + x′′a + (la − t1)/8. (8)
Since va(Jmin) is at most t1/8, (17) directly implies the theorem. Let us call items in (M \J)∪Jmin
as filler items (each has value < 18) and items in J \ Jmin as base items (each has value > 14).
In re-enumerated partition P , recall that each of {P1, . . . , Pt1} contains a base item whose value
is at least the maximum of all the items in the remaining bundles. Further, if there are two base
items in any bundle Pk in {P1, . . . , Pt1}, then va(Pk) > 1. If each bundle in {P1, . . . , Pt1} has
exactly one base item (t1 bundles in total) then items of value at least x
′
a + t1/4 are needed to
make all these bundles at least 1. This, together with Theorem 22, proves the bound. On the other
hand, if there are more than t1 base items in {P1, . . . , Pt1}, then for each extra base item j, there
are two cases. If j comes from Bk ∈ L2 then clearly, x′a will decrease by less than vaj but x′′a will
increase by vaj , so the bound only improves. For the other case, if j comes from Bk ∈ Ka then it
will make Bk \ {j} to need more low value items than the bundle in {P1, . . . , Pt1} who gets j to
become one, so x′a will only increase and x′′a stays same, and hence the bound only improves. This
completes the proof.
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4 Algorithm for 3/4-MMS Allocation
The existence proof of 34 -MMS allocation in Section 3 requires the knowledge of the exact MMS
value µi’s of all agents, e.g., the proof of valid reduction for bundle S4 in Lemma 4 needs this
assumption. Finding an exact µi of an agent i is an NP-Hard problem, however a PTAS exists [25].
This implies a PTAS to compute a (34 − )-MMS allocation for an  > 0. However, for small , this
PTAS is computationally very expensive and may not be practical. In this section, we show that
our algorithmic technique in Section 3 is powerful enough to be modified into a strongly polynomial
time algorithm to find an exact 34 -MMS allocation for a given instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉. The key
idea is to use the average as an upper-bound for the MMS value; see Lemma 1.
We fix the order of agents in N such that at each step of the algorithm if there are more than
one agent satisfied the conditions of valid reduction, defined in Section 2.1.3, we choose one with
the lowest index. We maintain the same order among remaining agents after every valid reduction.
For the ease of exposition, as in Section 3, we abuse the notation and use M and N to denote the
set of unallocated items and the set of agents who have not received any bundle yet, respectively.
Further, we use j to denote the jth highest value item in M , and i to denote the ith agent in N as
per the fixed order. Moreover, we use n := |N | and m := |M |.
In this section, unlike what we did in Section 3 (normalizing the valuation of items based on
actual µni (M)) we normalize vij ’s using the total value of all items.
Definition 3. We call an instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 normalized if vi(M) = n for all i ∈ N .
Using the scale invariance property (Lemma 2), we can without loss of generality work with the
normalized valuations so that vi(M) = n for all agents i ∈ N . As it is shown in Section 2.1, we
can also assume I to be an ordered instance, i.e., vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vim, for all i ∈ N . The proof
of following lemma is straightforward.
Corollary 12.1. For a normalized instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, µni (M) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N.
The algorithm to compute 34 -MMS allocation is given in Algorithm 4. It has three main parts:
Initial Assignment, Update Upper Bound, and Bag Filling. Initial Assignment is further divided
into two parts: Fixed and Tentative.
Algorithm 4: 3/4-MMS Allocation
Input : Ordered Instance 〈N,M, V 〉, i.e., vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vim,∀i ∈ N
Output: 34 -MMS Allocation
1 Normalize Valuations (i.e., scale valuations so that vi(M) = n, ∀i ∈ N) // n = |N |
2 (N,M, V )← Fixed-Assignment(N,M, V ) // Algorithm 5
3 (N t,M t, V t)← Tentative-Assignment(N,M, V ) // Algorithm 6
4 while N21 6= ∅ do
5 i← the lowest index agent in N21 // N21 agents are defined in (9)
6 Undo Tentative-assignments // go back to (N,M, V )
7 Update i’s MMS upper bound // Theorem 13
8 (N,M, V )← Fixed-Assignment(N,M, V ) // these assignments are final
9 (N t,M t, V t)← Tentative-Assignment(N,M, V )
10 Make all tentative assignments final: (N,M, V )← (N t,M t, V t)
11 Bag-Filling(N,M, V, α) for α = 34 // Section 4.3 and Algorithm 3
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4.1 Initial Assignment
This section is very similar to Section 3.1 where we assign S1, S2, S3, and S4 to agents in order
to reduce the number of high-value items to at most 2n. The main difference for this section is
assigning S4. Since assigning S4 is a valid reduction only if µ
n
i (M) = 1 (Lemma 4), therefore,
when S1, S2, and S3 value less than
3
4 for all agents we check for S4 and if the first S4 is allocated,
this allocation and all initial allocations after that are called tentative assignments. Tentative
assignments are finalized only if allocation of any S4 did not take away too much valuation for any
agent in N .
It is crucial for this step to assign bundles to agents according to an order. Therefore, for S1,
S2, S3, and S4 the bundle with lower index has more priority and if there are more than one agent
satisfied with S ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4} we choose the one with lower index based on the original order
of N . This ordering will be useful when we have to undo the tentative assignments.
Update N,M, V After every assignment, say bundle Ai to agent i, we update N,M, V as follows:
M ←M \A(i); N ← N \ {i}; vi′(M)← vi′j · |N |
vi′(M)
,∀i′ ∈ N, j ∈M .
Note that this maintains µni (M) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N after normalization (Definition 3 and Lemma 1).
4.1.1 Fixed Assignment
In this part, we allocate high-value items to agents using Algorithm 5. We assign the bundle
S ∈ {S1, S2, S3} to the lowest index agent i ∈ N for which vi(S) ≥ 34 . Then, we update N,M, V
and repeat this step until no such agent exists. Lemma 4 is applicable here to show that allocating
S ∈ {S1, S2, S3} to agent i and removing them from M and N is a valid reduction.
Algorithm 5: Fixed-Assignment
Input : Ordered Instance 〈N,M, V 〉 (i.e., vi1 ≥ · · · ≥ vim,∀i ∈ N), where µni (M) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N
Output: Fixed Assignments and Reduced Instance
1 For any S ⊆M , define Γ(S) = {i ∈ N : vi(S) ≥ 34}
2 S1 := {1}; S2 := {n, n+ 1}; S3 := {2n− 1, 2n, 2n+ 1} // bundles that can be assigned
3 T = Γ(S1) ∪ Γ(S2) ∪ Γ(S3)
4 while T 6= ∅ do
5 S ← the lowest index bundle in {S1, S2, S3} for which Γ(S) 6= ∅
6 i← the lowest index agent in Γ(S)
7 Assign S to agent i // final assignment
8 Update N,M, V, T
9 return N,M, V
As in Section 3, let J1 := {1, . . . , n} denote the set of first n items. Similarly, define J2 :=
{n+ 1, . . . , 2n} and J := J1 ∪ J2. Note that Corollary 4.1 is also applicable here.
4.1.2 Tentative Assignment
This step is a continuation of Fixed Assignment in Section 4.1.1 and it starts when Algorithm 5
terminates and the first S4 bundle is being assigned. In this part, we assume that µ
n
i (M) = 1,∀i ∈
N , i.e., the actual MMS value for each agent is equal to her current MMS upper bound, and we
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allocate S1, S2, S3, S4 using this assumption. In the next step, either this assumption works fine
and we make all tentative assignments final and move to the next stage of bag filling or we detect
an agent i for whom µni (M) is significantly lower than 1. In the latter case, we update i’s MMS
upper bound. In particular, we update the MMS upper bound by updating the valuations so that
the new MMS upper bound remains 1 for every agent.
In Algorithm 6, for S ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4} we check whether there exists an i ∈ N with vi(S) ≥ 34 .
If true, then we tentatively assign the lowest index such a bundle S to the lowest index such an
agent i and we tentatively update M,N, V as we did in Section 4.1.1. Choosing the lowest index
Sk makes sure that when S4 is assigned, then none of S1, S2, S3 satisfies the condition. This is
essential in proving that assigning S4 to an agent is a valid reduction in Lemma 4. Further, note
that when S4 is assigned, the value of each bundle in {S1, S2, S3} for every agent is strictly less
than 34 . However, after removing an agent i with S4, it may later trigger valid reductions with
{S1, S2, S3}.
Algorithm 6: Tentative-Assignment
Input : Ordered Instance 〈N,M, V 〉 that satisfies Conditions 1-3 in Corollary 4.1
Output: Tentative Assignments and Reduced Instance
1 For any S ⊆M , define Γ(S) = {i ∈ N : vi(S) ≥ 34}
2 S1 := {1}; S2 := {n, n+ 1}; S3 := {2n− 1, 2n, 2n+ 1}; S4 := {1, 2n+ 1}
3 T = Γ(S1) ∪ Γ(S2) ∪ Γ(S3) ∪ Γ(S4)
4 while T 6= ∅ do
5 S ← the lowest index bundle in {S1, S2, S3, S4} for which Γ(S) 6= ∅
6 i← the lowest index agent in Γ(S)
7 Assign S to agent i // tentative assignment
8 Update N,M, V, T
9 return N,M, V
4.2 Updating MMS Upper Bound
The goal here is first to detect the agents for whom the MMS value upper bound is overestimated
and second to update this bound for them. To detect these agents we continue as in Section 3
by first initializing n bags as in (4) (see Figure 1), and divide agents into two types N1 and N2
according to their valuations for these bags. Recall that N1 is the set of agents who value each bag
at most 1, and N2 is the remaining set of agents.
In this section, we need to analyze agents in N2 more thoroughly. We further partition agents
in N2 into two sub-types as follows:
N21 := {i ∈ N2 : ki > li and vi(M \ J) < xi + li/8}; N22 := N2 \N21 . (9)
If N21 is empty, then we do not need to update the MMS upper bounds and we can proceed to
the next stage of bag filling. Note that Theorem 12 is still applicable for all agents in N2, which
implies the following corollary.
Corollary 12.2. For any agent i ∈ N21, µi < 1.
The next theorem gives a new upper bound for these agents.
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Theorem 13. For any i ∈ N21, µi ≤ α = max{α1, α2, α3, α4, α5}, where
α1 =
4
3vi1 α2 =
4
3(vin + vi(n+1)) α3 =
4
3(vi(2n−1) + vi(2n) + vi(2n+1))
α4 =
4
3(vik + vik′) α5 =
vi(M \ J) + 34 li − xi
7
8 li
,
where k and k′ are respectively the maximum value items from J and M \J that were not tentatively
assigned, and 〈N,M, V 〉 refers to the instance after we undo the tentative assignments in line 6 of
Algorithm 4.
Proof. Suppose µi = β and β > α. We have
β > α1 =⇒ vi1 < 34β β > α2 =⇒ (vin + vi(n+1)) < 34β
β > α3 =⇒ (vi(2n−1) + vi(2n) + vi(2n+1)) < 34β β > α4 =⇒ (vik + vik′) < 34β .
From this, we can conclude that vi(S) < (
3
4)µi for S ∈ {S1, S2, S3}. Therefore, agent i will not
be satisfied in Fixed-Assignment step. Further, since each bundle in {S1, S2, S3} is worth strictly
less than (34)µi to agent i, all S4 bundles that are tentatively assigned, (see Algorithm 6) have value
at most µi, and hence all tentative assignments are valid reductions (Lemma 4). Also, since β > α4,
no new pair that form S4 will satisfy i. Furthermore, by scaling the vij ’s by β the value of the
bags in (4) will increase and consequently ki will not decrease and li will not increase, therefore, ki
will remain greater than li after scaling the valuations of agent i by β. Consequently, since ki > li
and β > α5, agent i will remain in N
21 even after we normalize her valuation with respect to β. It
implies that µi < β (Corollary 12.2), which is a contradiction.
We pick an agent i with the lowest index in N21 and update i’s valuation as vij ← vijα , ∀j ∈M
and repeat. In Theorem 14, we show that the number of updates is at most n3 times.
4.3 Bag Filling and Running Time
Note that we reach at the bag filling stage only when N21 (see (9)) is empty. Here, we use
Algorithm 3 of Section 3.2. Since N21 (see (9)) is empty, Lemma 6 is applicable, which implies a
3
4 -MMS allocation. Next, we show that the entire algorithm runs in strongly polynomial time.
Theorem 14. The entire algorithm runs in O(n5m) time for an ordered instance, and in O(nm(n4+
logm)) time for any instance.
Proof. In Algorithm 4, normalization takes O(mn) arithmetic operations. Both Fixed-assignment
and Tentative-Assignment procedures take at most O(n2m) arithmetic operations. The bag-filling
procedure takes at most O(n2m) time. Each iteration of the while loop takes O(n2) arithmetic
operations to find the set N21 of agents, O(m) arithmetic operations to update valuations of
an agent i ∈ N21, and O(n2m) arithmetic operations to run Fixed-Assignment and Tentative-
Assignment procedures. Therefore, each iteration of the while loop takes at mostO(n2m) arithmetic
operations.
To bound the number of iterations of the while loop, we upper bound the number of times it
is run for a particular agent, say a, in N21. Consider the first iteration when a is the lowest index
agent, then if we update a’s valuation due to α ∈ {α1, α2, α3} (see Section 4.2), then a gets a
fixed assignment after this iteration, and we will not see her again. If we update a’s valuation due
to α = α4, then in the future iterations, it will not be in N
21 unless another agent in N21 ends
her iteration due to α ∈ {α1, α2, α3}. Clearly, this can happen at most O(n) time. Finally, if we
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update a’s valuation due to α = α5, then it will not be in N
21 again unless another agent of N21
ends her iteration due to α ∈ {α1, α2, α3, α4}. This can happen at most O(n2) time. Therefore,
the maximum number of iterations of the while loop is at most O(n3). Since each iteration takes
at most O(n2m) arithmetic operations, Algorithm 4 takes O(n5m) time. Note that this is for an
ordered instance.
Algorithm 7 takes O(mn logm) time to make the original instance ordered by creating a sorted
list of items for each agent. Next, we show that Algorithm 8 can be implemented in O(mn) time.
Initialize a binary array A of size m to all ones. A[j] indicates whether item j is available or not;
1 means available. Each agent has a sorted list of items from the Algorithm 7. From the solution
of the ordered instance using Algorithm 4, we can create an array B of size m, where B[j] stores
the agent who is assigned the item j. Observe that B can be constructed in O(m) time. Then, for
each item j from 1 to m, we get the agent B[j] who is assigned j, and then we try to give B[j] the
highest item in her list. If her highest item is not available, which we can check from A, then we
delete this item from B[j]’s list, and move down to the next highest item and repeat until we reach
at an available item. We give this item to B[j] and mark it assigned in A. Since the size of each
agent’s list is m, the total time is O(mn). Using Algorithms 7 and 8 together with Algorithm 4,
the running time of the entire procedure is O(nm(n4 + logm)).
5 Existence of (34 +
1
12n)-MMS Allocation
In this section, we show that our approach in Section 3 can be extended to obtain the existence of
(34 + γ)-MMS allocation for a given instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉 where γ = 112n . We note that γ is a
constant for the given instance, where n := |N |. We assume that the MMS value µi of each agent
i is given. Finding an exact µi is an NP-Hard problem, however a PTAS exists [25]. This implies
a PTAS to compute a (34 + γ − )-MMS allocation for any  > 0. Using the properties shown in
Section 2.1, we normalize valuations so that µ1 = 1,∀i and assume that I is an ordered instance,
i.e., vi1 ≥ · · · ≥ vi|M |,∀i. Our proof is algorithmic. If more than one agent satisfy the conditions
(3) of valid reduction, then we choose one arbitrarily.
For the ease of exposition, we abuse the notation and use M and N to denote the set of
unallocated items and the set of agents who have not received any bundle yet, respectively. Further,
we use j to denote the jth highest value item in M . Moreover, we use n := |N | and m := |M |.
This is the reason we use γ, which is a constant for a given instance, to denote the approximation
factor.
The approach is same as in Section 3. Here, we run Algorithm 1 with α = 34 +γ. The analysis is
also almost same. Here, we crucially use the extra 18 (see (6) and the paragraph after it) to obtain
a better factor. To avoid repetition, we only highlight the differences.
5.1 Initial Assignment
In Algorithm 2, we keep assigning a bundle S ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4} to agent i, if any, for which
vi(S) ≥ 34 + γ. Then, we update M and N to respectively reflect the current unallocated items
and agents who are not assigned with any bundle yet. Observe that Lemma 4 is applicable here to
show that assigning a bundle S ∈ {S1, S2, S3} is a valid reduction. However, it only applies for S4
when vi(S4) ≤ 1,∀i.
As in Section 3, let J1 := {1, . . . , n} denote the set of first n items. Similarly, define J2 :=
{n+ 1, . . . , 2n} and J := J1 ∪ J2. The following corollary is straightforward.
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Corollary 14.1. If vi(S) <
3
4 + γ,∀i and ∀S ∈ {S1, S2, S3}, then (i) vij < 34 + γ, ∀j ∈ J1, (ii)
vij <
3
8 +
γ
2 , ∀j ∈ J2, and vin < 34 + γ − vi(n+1), and (iii) vij < 14 + γ3 , ∀j ∈M \ J , for all i.
However, the value of S4 might be strictly greater than 1 for an agent i. Corollary 14.1 implies
that, vi(S4) <
3
4 + γ +
1
4 +
γ
3 = 1 +
4γ
3 . We use dummy items to fix the issue of extra 4γ/3.
Dummy items (D1): For each removed S4 in Algorithm 2, we add one dummy item dj such
that
vi({dj}) = 4γ
3
∀i ∈ N . (10)
Let D1 denote the set of all dummy items after the termination of Algorithm 2. We note that
dummy items will not be assigned to any agent. They are defined to make proofs easy and more
intuitive. Later, we introduce two more sets D2 and D3 of dummy items in Section 5.2. Let
D := D1 ∪D2 ∪D3 with D2 = D3 = ∅ currently. The proof of the following corollary easily follows
from Lemma 4.
Corollary 14.2. For any remaining agent i ∈ N , µni (M ∪D) ≥ 1.
The proof of the following lemma easily follows using (10) and Corollary 14.2.
Lemma 15. When Algorithm 2 terminates, we have µni (M) ≥ 1 − 4γr3 and vi(M) ≥ n − 4γr3 , ∀i,
where r is the total number of rounds in Algorithm 2 when S4 is assigned.
5.2 Bag Filling
The overall approach is same as in Section 3.2. We use the bag filling procedure given in Algorithm 3
to satisfy the remaining agent by setting α = 34 +γ. We initialize the bags with items in J as in (4)
(see Figure 1). Algorithm 3 has n rounds. In each round k, it starts a new bundle T with T ← Bk.
If there is an agent who values T to be at least 34 + γ, then assign T to such an agent. Otherwise,
keep adding items from M \ J to T one by one until someone values T at least 34 + γ.
For correctness, we need to show that there are enough items in M \ J to add on top of each
bag in (4) so that each agent gets a bundle which they value at least 34 +γ. For this, we first divide
agents into two types: N1 := {i ∈ N | vi(Bk) ≤ 1 + 3γ2 , ∀k} and N2 := N \N1. Next, we update
the notations of (11) to reflect the improved bound. For an agent i ∈ N2, define
Li := {Bk : vi(Bk) < 34 + γ}; li := |Li| and Ki := {Bk : vi(Bk) > 1 + 3γ2 }; ki := |Ki|
xi := (
3
4 + γ)li −
∑
k:Bk∈Li
vi(Bk).
(11)
The proof of the following lemma is an easy extension of Lemma 5, hence omitted.
Lemma 16. For an agent i ∈ N2, (i) li > 0 and ki > 0, (ii) vi1 > 58 +γ, (iii) vi(Bk) < 98 + 3γ2 ,∀k,
and (iv) vij <
1
8 ,∀j ∈M \ J .
The proof of the following lemma is an extension of the proof of Lemma 6, and is in Appendix A.
Lemma 17. If vi(M \ J) ≥ xi + li/8− 1/8,∀i ∈ N2, then Algorithm 3 with α = 34 + γ gives every
agent a bundle that they value at least 34 + γ.
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Now, we only need to show that for each i ∈ N2, we have
vi(M \ J) ≥ xi + li/8− 1/8 (12)
We start with a few lemmas. Recall from (2) that Pni (M) denote the set of partitions achieving
µi. The proofs of the following two lemmas are extensions of the corresponding Lemmas 7 and 8
respectively, and are given in Appendix A.
Lemma 18. For an agent i ∈ N2, there exists a bundle Pk in every partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈
Pni (M ∪D) such that vi(Pk \ J) > 14 − γ.
Lemma 19. For every agent i, there exists a partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈ Pni (M ∪D) such that
each Pk ∈ P has at most one item j with vij > 58 + γ.
Fix an agent, say a, in N2. For simplicity, until the end of this section, when we use value of
an item or a bundle, we mean their value for agent a (unless mentioned otherwise). Recall that we
need to show (12). Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Pna (M ∪D) be a partition satisfying the condition of
Lemma 19.
We manipulate P as follows: First, for each Bi = {j, j′} with 34 +γ ≤ va(Bi) ≤ 1 + 3γ2 , if j ∈ Pk
and j′ ∈ Pk′ , then we turn Pk and Pk′ into two new bundles {j, j′} and (Pk ∪ Pk′ ∪ {dj} \ {j, j′}),
where dj is a new dummy item with va(dj) :=
3γ
2 .
Dummy items (D2): Let D2 denote the set of all dummy items added during the manipulation
of P . Observe that |D2| = n− ka − la. Each dj ∈ D2 values 3γ2 for agent a. Therefore,
va(D2) =
3γ|D2|
2
. (13)
Later we introduce one more set D3 of dummy items. Recall that D = D1 ∪D2 ∪D3 where D1
is defined in (10) and D3 = ∅ currently. Observe that va (Pk ∪ Pk′ ∪ {dj} \ {j, j′}) ≥ 1. Hence, we
can assume that for each Bi 6∈ La ∪Ka (as defined in (11)), there exists a Pk = Bi and all other
bundles value at least 1. Second, we re-enumerate the bundles in P such that
• P1, . . . , Pt1 : each has an item, say j, of value more than 58 + γ and va(Bj) < 34 + γ
• Pt1+1, . . . , Pt2 : each has an item, say j, of value more than 58 + γ and va(Bj) > 1 (Observe
that there are ka such bundles, so t2 − t1 = ka)
• Pt3+1, . . . , Pn: each such Pk = Bk′ for some k′ and 34 + γ ≤ va(Bk′) ≤ 1 + 3γ2
• Pt2+1, . . . , Pt3 be the remaining bundles (Observe that t3 = la + ka).
Definition 4. Define y := vak′ where k
′ is the highest value item in the set {j ∈ J2∩Bk, Bk ∈ Ka}.
Observe that 14 +
γ
2 < y <
3
8 +
γ
2 . For instance, in Figure 1, if no bag from {Bk+1, . . . , Bn} is in
Ka but Bk ∈ Ka, then y = va(2n−k+1). This also implies that va1 ≥ · · · ≥ vak > 58 + γ. Moreover,
y = va(2n−k+1) ≤ va(2n−k) ≤ · · · ≤ va(k+1). The proof of the following lemma is an easy extension
of the proof of Lemma 9, and hence omitted.
Lemma 20. For any bundle Bk = {j, j′} ∈ La such that vaj , vaj′ < 58 + γ, we have vaj , vaj′ ≥ y.
Next, we show the extension of Lemma 10, whose proof is given in Appendix A.
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Lemma 21. For agent a ∈ N2, if t1 = 0 then we have
1. xa ≤ (34 + γ − 2y)la
2. va(M ∪ D \ J) ≥ max{xa + la(14 − γ) − yz + z(14 − γ), z(14 − γ)}, where z = max{2ka −
|⋃t2t=t1+1 Pt ∩ J |, 0}.
The following lemma is an extension of Theorem 22, and its proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 22. For agent a ∈ N2, if t1 = 0 then
va(M ∪D \ J) ≥ xa + la/8 . (14)
Next, we handle the general case when t1 > 0. Let L
1 ⊆ La be the set of bags in La which have
one item with value more than 58 + γ, and L
2 = La \ L1. Clearly, |L1| = t1 and |L2| = l− t1. Note
that |L2| > 1a because Bn ∈ L2.
Dummy items (D3): For each bag in L
1 we add a dummy item dj where va(dj) = γ. Therefore,
va(D3) = |D3| · γ = |L1| · γ < la · γ . (15)
The following theorem is an extension of Theorem 12, and its proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 23. For agent a ∈ N2, we have va(M ∪D \ J) ≥ xa + la/8.
Finally, we obtain the bound without the dummy items in the next theorem.
Theorem 24. For any agent a ∈ N2, va(M \ J) ≥ xa + la/8− 1/8.
Proof. From Lemma 15, (13), and (15), the total value of the items in D is at most
va(D) ≤ 4γr
3
+
3γ|D2|
2
+ γla ≤ 3γn
2
≤ 1
8
,
because |D2| + r ≤ (n − ka − la) and γ = 112n , where n is the number of agents in the original
instance. This, together with Theorem 23, proves the theorem.
6 Conclusions
We developed a new approach that gives a simple algorithm for showing the existence of 34 -MMS
allocation. Furthermore, we showed that our approach is powerful enough to be easily extended to
obtain (i) a strongly polynomial time algorithm to find a 34 -MMS allocation, and (ii) the existence of
a (34 +
1
12n)-MMS allocation, breaking the barrier of
3
4 . Consequently, this gives a PTAS for finding
a (34 +
1
12n − )-MMS allocation for an  > 0. It could be worth exploring whether the approach
extends to obtaining a 45 -MMS allocation. Such an extension would be challenging because after
the initial greedy assignments, there will be 3n high-value items, and this would make the process
of initializing the bag filling procedure harder due to too many items to handle and also the value
of some bags might exceed significantly more than 1.
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A Missing Proofs
Lemma 1. (Average upper bounds MMS). µni (M) ≤ vi(M)/n,∀i ∈ N .
Proof. Suppose for some agent i, µni (M) > vi(M)/n, i.e., there exist a partition of M into n
bundles where all bundles have value strictly more than vi(M)n . Therefore, vi(M) ≥ n · µni (M) >
n · vi(M)/n = vi(M), which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2. (Scale Invariance). Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an α-MMS allocation for instance
I = 〈N,M, V 〉. If we create an alternate instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉 where valuations of some agent
i are scaled by c > 0, i.e., v′ij := c · vij ,∀j ∈M , then µ′i = c · µi and A is an α-MMS allocation for
I ′ .
Proof. For any bundle S ⊆ M , we have v′i(S) = c · vi(S). Therefore, µ′i = c · µi. Further,
v′i(Ak) = c · vi(Ak) ≥ c · α · µi = α · µ′i, ∀k.
Lemma 3. (Ordered Instance [10, 6]). Without loss of generality, we can assume that agents
have the same order of preference over the items, i.e., vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vim, ∀i ∈ N .
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Algorithm 7: [6] Conversion to an Ordered Instance
Input : Instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉
Output: Instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉 which v′i1 ≥ · · · ≥ v′im for all i ∈ N
1 for i = 1 to n do
2 for j = 1 to m do
3 j∗ ← jth highest value item of M for agent i
4 v′ij ← vij∗
Algorithm 8: [6] α-MMS Allocation for Unordered Instance
Input : Instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, Ordered Instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉, α-MMS allocation A′ = (A′i)i∈N for
I ′
Output: α-MMS allocation A = (Ai)i∈N for I
1 Ai ← ∅,∀i
2 for j = 1 to m do
3 i∗ ← i ∈ N : j ∈ A′i // i∗ is the agent who has jth item of I ′ in her bundle
4 j∗ ← arg maxj∈M\(⋃i∈N Ai) vi∗j // j∗ is i∗’s favorite unassigned item
5 Ai∗ ← Ai∗ ∪ {j∗}
Proof. Consider Algorithms 7 and 8. It is enough to show that given any instance I = 〈N,M, V 〉, we
can find an ordered instance I ′ = 〈N,M, V ′〉 in polynomial time using Algorithm 7. Furthermore,
given an α-MMS allocation A′ for the ordered version I ′, we can find α-MMS allocation A for the
original instance I in polynomial time using Algorithm 8.
Clearly, items in I ′ are sorted by their value and they have the same order for all agents. Also,
it takes mn iterations to obtain I ′. Note that MMS value will remain same in I ′ since MMS value
does not depend on the order of items or the valuation of other agent. We prove that vi(Ai) ≥ v′i(A′i)
for all i ∈ N . Consider the round r of the Algorithm 8 and consider item r from I ′ is in A′i. It
means that agent i is getting her rth favorite item in A′i but now after r − 1 round, exactly r − 1
items are allocated and she will get her favorite item among un-allocated items. Therefore, the
item she gets in this round is at least as valuable as the one she was getting in the ordered instance.
Therefore, vi(Ai) ≥ v′i(A′i) ≥ α · µi.
Lemma 17. If vi(M \ J) ≥ xi + li/8− 1/8,∀i ∈ N2, then Algorithm 3 with α = 34 + γ gives every
agent a bundle that they value at least 34 + γ.
Proof. This is proof by contradiction. Suppose the algorithm stops at round t because there are
not enough items in L (= M \ J) to satisfy any remaining agent i, i.e., vi(Bt ∪ L) < 34 + γ.
If i ∈ N1, each removed bundle in rounds k ∈ [t − 1], has value of at most 1 + 3γ2 for agent
i. Because, if vi(Bk) ≥ 34 + γ for k ∈ [t − 1], no more item has been added to T = Bk. Also,
if vi(Bk) <
3
4 + γ for k ∈ [t − 1] before adding the last item (if any) to T the value of T is less
that 34 + γ and from Corollary 14.1, vij <
1
4 +
γ
3 for j ∈ L. Therefore, at the end of the round
vi(T ) < 1 +
3γ
2 .
This implies that the total value of assigned bundles in round 1 to t−1 is at most (t−1)(1+ 3γ2 ).
Let n′ be the number of agents remaining after Algorithm 2, and n be the number of agents in the
original instance. We have vi(M) ≥ n′ − 4γr3 due to Lemma 15. Therefore, the value of items in L
before the round t starts is at least
vi(L) ≥ n′ − 4γr
3
−
(
(t− 1)(1 + 3γ2 ) + vi(Bt) + (n′ − t)(1 + 3γ2 )
)
.
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This implies that
vi(L) + vi(Bt) ≥ 1− 3(r + (n
′ − 1))γ
2
≥ 1− 3(n− 1)γ
2
≥ 7
8
+
1
8n
≥ 3
4
+ γ,
where we use γ = 112n , which is a contradiction.
If i ∈ N2, then since at round t, vi(T ) < 34 + γ, we have Bt ∈ Li. Consider a round k ∈ [t− 1].
If Bk 6∈ Li, then T = Bk has been assigned to someone with no additional items added to T from L
because i ∈ N(T ). If Bk ∈ Li, then in round k, before adding the last item (if any) to T , the value
of i for T is less that 34 + γ and from Lemma 16, all items in L have value of at most
1
8 . Therefore,
if Bk ∈ Li, the value of the assigned bag for i in round k is less that 78 + γ. Hence, in the beginning
of the round t,
vi(L) ≥ (xi + li/8− 1/8)−
(
xi − (34 + γ − vi(Bt)) + (li − 1)/8)
)
= 34 + γ − vi(Bt),
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 18. For an agent i ∈ N2, there exists a bundle Pk in every partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈
Pni (M ∪D) such that vi(Pk \ J) > 14 − γ.
Proof. If there exists a bundle Pk with exactly one item j from J , then vi(Pk \J) = 1− vij > 14 −γ
because value of every item is less than 34 + γ. Otherwise, each bundle has exactly two items from
J , which implies that one of the bundles, say Pk, has two items j1, j2 from the set {n} ∪ J2. Since
vij1 + vij2 ≤ vin + vi(n+1) < 34 + γ, vi(Pk \ J) > 14 − γ.
Lemma 19. For every agent i, there exists a partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈ Pni (M ∪D) such that
each Pk ∈ P has at most one item j with vij > 58 + γ.
Proof. We show that if there are two items j1, j2 with each value more than
5
8 +γ for an agent i in a
bundle Pk of P ∈ Pni (M∪D), then we can construct another P ′ ∈ Pni (M∪D) where this is not true.
Corollary 14.1 implies that there must exist another bundle Pk′ for which maxj∈Pk′ vij <
3
8 +
γ
2 .
If there exists a partition Q1k′ and Q
2
k′ of items in Pk′ such that value of each Q
1
k′ and Q
2
k′ is at
least 38 − γ, then we can rearrange items in Pk ∪ Pk′ and make two new bundles ({j1} ∪Q1k′) and
({j2} ∪ Q2k′). Clearly, the value of each bundle is at least 1 and each has exactly one item with
value more than 58 + γ.
If no such Q1k′ and Q
2
k′ exists, then we claim that there exists a partition of Pk′ into three
sets with each value less than 38 . We can find this partition as follows: Initialize three empty
bundles, and repeatedly add the highest value item of Pk′ to the bundle with the lowest value. For
a contradiction, suppose one of the three bundles has value more than 38 , then the sum of the values
of the other two sets must be less than 38 because otherwise, they make a partition of two with each
value more than 38 − γ. This means that at least one of the bundles must have a value less than
3
16 . This implies that the value of the largest bag before adding the last item must be less than
3
16
and the last item also should value less than 316 , which is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists a
partition Q1k′ , Q
2
k′ and Q
3
k′ of Pk′ such that each value less than
3
8 .
According to Lemma 18, there exists a bundle Pkˆ ∈ Pni (M) such that vi(Pkˆ \ J) > 14 − γ. Let
vi(Pkˆ) = 1 + δ for some δ ≥ 0. Observe that Pk′ cannot be same as Pkˆ and Pk, otherwise we would
have made two bundles earlier, each with value at least 1 and exactly one item more than 58 + γ.
We make three bags:
bag 1 : {j1} ∪Q1k′ bag 2 : {j2} ∪Q2k′ bag 3 : (Pkˆ ∩ J) ∪Q3k′
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The value of each of bag 1 and bag 2 is at most 98 +
3γ
2 and the value of bag 3 is at most
9
8 +γ+δ.
The total value of all items in Pk, Pk′ and Pkˆ is at least 3 +
2
8 + δ + 2γ. We sort the remaining
items in decreasing order and add them one by one to a bag with the lowest value. Since the value
of the last item added to each bag has a value of at most 18 (from Lemma 16), each bag has a value
of at least 1 and it has at most one item with value more than 58 + γ. We repeat this process for
all bundles with two item of value more than 58 + γ to find a desired partition.
Lemma 21. For agent a ∈ N2, if t1 = 0 then we have
1. xa ≤ (34 + γ − 2y)la
2. va(M ∪ D \ J) ≥ max{xa + la(14 − γ) − yz + z(14 − γ), z(14 − γ)}, where z = max{2ka −
|⋃t2t=t1+1 Pt ∩ J |, 0}.
Proof. For the first part, since t1 = 0, we have va(Bk) ≥ 2y,∀Bk ∈ La (Lemma 20). This implies
that xa = (
3
4 + γ)la −
∑
k:Bk∈La Bk ≤ (34 + γ − 2y)la.
For the second part, in
⋃
k:Bk∈Ka Bk there are exactly 2ka items from J . If there are at least 2ka
items in
⋃t2
t=t1+1
Pt ∩J then z = 0. On the other hand, if there are 2ka− z items in
⋃t2
t=t1+1
Pt ∩J ,
then it means that there are at least z bundles in Pt1+1, . . . , Pt2 with exactly one item from J . Each
of these bundles need more than 14 − γ value of items from M \ J to become 1.
Next, if z = 0, then all bundles in {Pt2+1, . . . , Pt3} need at least xa+la(14−γ) value of items from
M \ J to become 1 because the value of each item in the bundles of La is at least y (follows from
Definition 4 and the construction of Bk’s in (4)). If z > 0, then all bundles in {Pt2+1, . . . , Pt3} need
at least xa+ la(
1
4 −γ)−yz value of items from M \J to become one because each of the z items has
value at most y (Lemma 20). Therefore, in total, there should be at least xa+la(
1
4−γ)−yz+z(14−γ)
value of items from M \ J in {Pt1+1, . . . , Pt3}.
Further, in case z is large such that the value of xa + la(
1
4 − γ)− yz + z(14 − γ) is negative, we
still need z(14 − γ) value of items from M \ J to make all bundles in {Pt1+1, . . . , Pt2} value 1.
Theorem 22. For agent a ∈ N2, if t1 = 0 then
va(M ∪D \ J) ≥ xa + la/8 . (14)
Proof. Using Lemma 21(2) there are two cases for the maximum of xa + la(
1
4 − γ)− yz + z(14 − γ)
and z(14 − γ). We prove the claim for each case separately.
Case 1: Suppose xa + la(
1
4 − γ) − yz + z(14 − γ) ≥ z(14 − γ), then z ≤
xa+la(
1
4−γ)
y . Further,
Lemma 21(1) implies y ≤ la(
3
4 +γ)−xa
2la
. Using these, we get
va(M ∪D \ J) ≥ xa + la(14 − γ)− yz + z(14 − γ)
≥ xa(
1
4 − γ) + la(14 − γ)2
y
≥ 2xala(
1
4 − γ) + 2l2a(14 − γ)2
la(
3
4 + γ)− xa
.
We need to show that
2xala(
1
4 − γ) + 2l2a(14 − γ)2
la(
3
4 + γ)− xa
−
(
xa +
la
8
)
≥ 0 . (16)
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For n <= 4 (i.e., number of agents in the original instance is at most 4), there is a simpler
way to prove this claim. However, there are better approximation factors available for them in any
case [16], so we assume that n > 4. Since γ = 112n , it decreases as n increases. Therefore, it is
enough to show (16) for n = 5. For this, we put γ = 160 in (16) and get,
2xala(
1
4 − 160) + 2l2a(14 − 160)2
la(
3
4 +
1
60)− xa
−
(
xa +
la
8
)
=
7(30xala + 7l
2
a)
15(23la − 30xa) −
8xa + la
8
=
3600x2a − 630xala + 47l2a
120(23la − 30xa)
>
36(10xa − la)2 + la(11la + 90xa)
120(23la − 30xa)
≥ 0 .
The last inequality follows because the denominator is positive using the definition of xa.
Case 2: Suppose xa + la(
1
4 − γ)− yz + z(14 − γ) ≤ z(14 − γ). Then, using Lemma 21(1), we have
va((M ∪D) \ J) ≥ z(14 − γ) ≥
xa(
1
4 − γ) + la(14 − γ)2
y
≥ xa + la/8 ,
where the last inequality follows from the Case 1.
Theorem 23. For agent a ∈ N2, we have va(M ∪D \ J) ≥ xa + la/8.
Proof. Let Jmin =
⋃
Bk∈L1 Bk ∩ J2. Then, we have vaj < 18 ,∀j ∈ Jmin because these items are
bagged with an item value more than 58 +γ and together they have value less than
3
4 +γ. Therefore,
va(Jmin) < t1/8. Let x
′
a := (
3
4 + γ)t1 −
∑
Bk∈L1 va(Bk), and x
′′
a := xa − x′a. For agent a, we can
treat items of Jmin as low value items so we will prove:
va((M ∪D) \ J) + va(Jmin) ≥ x′a + t1/4 + x′′a + (la − t1)/8. (17)
Since va(Jmin) is at most t1/8, (17) directly implies the theorem. Let us call items in (M \ J) ∪
Jmin ∪D as filler items (each has value < 18) and items in J \ Jmin as base items (each has value
> 14 +
γ
3 ).
In re-enumerated Pna (M ∪D), recall that each of {P1, . . . , Pt1} contains a base item whose value
is at least the maximum of all the items in the remaining bundles. Further, if there are two base
items in any bundle Pk in {P1, . . . , Pt1}, then va(Pk) > 1. If each bundle in {P1, . . . , Pt1} has
exactly one base item (t1 bundles in total) then items of value at least x
′
a + t1(
1
4 − γ) are needed
to make all these bundles at least 1 and there are t1 items in D3 with value γ. This, together
with Theorem 22, proves the bound. On the other hand, if there are more than t1 base items in
{P1, . . . , Pt1}, then for each extra base item j, there are two cases. If j comes from Bk ∈ L2 then
clearly, x′a will decrease by less than vaj but x′′a will increase by vaj , so the bound only improves.
For the other case, if j comes from Bk ∈ Ka then it will make Bk \ {j} to need more low value
items than the bundle in {P1, . . . , Pt1} who gets j to become one, so x′a will only increase and x′′a
stays same, and hence the bound only improves. This completes the proof.
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